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This article provides formal definitions characterizing well-formed composition of components in
order to guarantee their safe deployment and execution. Our work focuses on the structural aspects of
component composition; it puts together most of the concepts common to many component models,
but never formalized as a whole. Our formalization characterizes correct component architectures
made of functional and non-functional aspects, both structured as component assemblies. Interceptor
chains can be used for a safe and controlled interaction between the two aspects. Our well-formed
components guarantee a set of properties ensuring that the deployed component system has a correct
architecture and can run safely. Finally, those definitions constitute the formal basis for our Eclipse-
based environment for the development and specification of component-based applications.
1 Introduction
Designing safe distributed component-based software systems is a challenging task including a wide
range of issues ranging from the safe composition of components to the applications performance and
reliability. This work focuses on the correctness of component assembly which is a strong prerequisite
for correct deployment and execution of components. We target component models which are hierarchi-
cal [13] and provide runtime control on the component application. In component-based software engi-
neering, this last feature, i.e. the control and management of the system architecture and of the business
application, is part of what is generally called non-functional concern. More precisely, non-functional
aspects may cover many aspects, from security, latency, time aspects, energy or cost, to management con-
cerns including mechanisms for dynamic reconfiguration, fault-tolerance, load balancing, self-healing,
or more elaborate autonomic behaviours. In this paper, we are essentialy considering the second cate-
gory, i.e. the management aspects, and we want to support the ability to design non-functional aspects
themselves as a component system, which ensures a clear design of the whole application. The business
logic of the application is called the functional aspect.
Our main goal is to provide a clear and formal definition of component assemblies and a set of
logic predicates ensuring the correctness of component composition and component interconnection. In
particular our predicates ensure a strong separation of concerns: a non-functional component can only
∗This work was partialy funded by the Associated Team DAESD between INRIA and ECNU, Shanghai; and by the french
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interact with non-functional components, or with non-functional interfaces of business components. This
way, each binding between components only transmits either functional or non-functional invocations.
However a clean interaction between these concerns is highly desirable: we introduce interceptors, which
are special components providing interaction between functional and non-functional elements. They can
observe functional invocations and trigger a reaction of the control part of the component. In the other
direction, non-functional components can influence the functional behavior by modifying its behaviour
in two ways: either through reconfiguration, i.e. modification at runtime of the component architecture,
or by changing parameters, i.e. component attributes, that will influence the functional behaviour.
In this paper we focus on one specific component model: the Grid Component Model (GCM) [4].
GCM allows the construction of distributed hierarchical applications with asynchronous group commu-
nications and strong separation between business logic and control parts of a system. To our knowledge,
GCM is one of the only established component models that provides specific features for managing com-
plex software systems, and that offers architectural artifacts and methodological approaches to organise
the control part of such applications. GCM-based systems can be designed and modeled using the Ver-
Cors tool1; An XML-based Architecture Description Language (ADL) file, describing the architecture
of the application, can then be generated by VerCors and used to build and deploy the GCM application,
using the GCM/ProActive execution environment [5]. We started from the formal representation of GCM
architecture given in [2] and introduced a number of important concepts. This article has the following
new contributions:
• First, we provide a formal representation of component architectures including a flexible set of
constructs for the definition of non-functional part of an application which has never been formal-
ized before. The business logic and control parts of a system are strongly separated.
• Second, we formalize the notion of interceptors and define a number of auxiliary predicates insur-
ing their safe composition with the rest of the system.
• Third, we specify a set of key properties for component architecture, those properties are guaran-
teed for any component assembly that is well-formed according to the rules defined in Section 3.4.
After validation of these rules, we garantee that the generated ADL code is correct, in the sense that
building the component-based application by running the GCM component factory will terminate
successfully with no runtime error. Additionally, the properties we exhibit are necessary prereq-
uisite for the correct execution and the reconfigurability of the system; those properties include
uniqueness of naming, separation of concerns, and communication determinacy.
• Finally, we implement an environment allowing graphical modeling and validity check for the
distributed systems architecture with respect to the proposed formalization.
The purpose of our formalization is threefold. First it is component model independent: by formaliz-
ing the correctness rules, we make them applicable outside the scope of GCM, and of our tools. Second,
it makes it easier to re-use the formalization for different purposes, e.g. to implement different checkers,
or encode it in a theorem prover. Finally, it allows reasoning on the properties ensured by the component
model: properties of Section 3.5 can be formally proven from the definition of component correctness.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Grid Component Model and our modeling
platform. Section 3 presents the formalization of GCM architecture and of correct architecture. Section
4 describes how to adapt our formalism to other features or other component models and presents an
overview of the related work. Section 5 describes our environment for modeling GCM-based systems.
1The VERCORS platform: VERification of models for distributed communicating COmponants, with safety and Security.
http://team.inria.fr/scale/software/vercors/
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Figure 1: A typical GCM component assembly (image produced by VerCors)
2 Context
2.1 GCM
GCM [4] is a component model targeting large-scale distributed applications. It is an extension of the
Fractal [7] component model; we summarize below the architectural aspects of GCM, and its main
advantages. We also provide an illustrative example of a real-world application built using GCM.
A GCM component application is a composition of components, interfaces and bindings. GCM is a
hierarchical component model, consequently there are two types of components in GCM: primitive and
composite ones. Composite components are used to compose other components while the primitive ones
are the leaves of the composition hierarchy. More precisely, a composite component (Application in
Figure 1) is made of two parts: membrane (gray part) and content (white part). The content contains the
sub-components dealing with the functional aspects. The membrane includes sub-components which are
responsible for everything besides business logic: control, monitoring, structural reconfiguration, etc. A
primitive component is similar except that the content is not known (e.g., Front-end, Repository and
W1 in Figure 1). It encapsulates some business code. It has a list of methods, which it can execute.
The communication between components is performed in the form of method invocation. In Fractal
and GCM interfaces are similar to object interfaces characterized by a set of methods that can transit
through this interface. There are client and server interfaces. Client interfaces (e.g. C1) emit the methods
invocations. Server interfaces (e.g. S1) receive them. We also distinguish the interfaces dealing with the
business logic (functional interfaces drawn in blue color) and the ones dealing with the control of an
application (non-functional ones colored in green). A binding is an arrow from a client to a server
interface, communications between components follow those bindings.
In GCM, the interfaces can be attached to the components. An interface that is accessible from the
exterior of a component is called an external interfaces (e.g. S1). When an interface is reachable from the
inside of a component, i.e. from its content, it is called an internal interfaces (e.g. M1). The membrane
of a component can also have internal interfaces, but they are not declared explicitly. The set of internal
interfaces of a membrane is represented by the union of two other sets: all the external interfaces of the
component containing the membrane and all the internal interfaces of the content inside the component.
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Figure 2: Internal interfaces of a membrane
All the interfaces are taken with the same properties, but with an opposite role (e.g. a server interface be-
comes a client one and vice-verse). Figure 2 illustrates the (implicite) internal interfaces of a membrane,
displayed in red color.
Figure 1 shows an illustrative example taken from [5]. It represents the architecture of a real-world
GCM system implementing an autonomic master-slave application treating incoming requests in paral-
lel. Component Front-end is a front-end of the application. It receives the job-requests from the user.
The requests are, then, processed by the workers (W1 and W2). The results are sent to the repository
represented by a component Repository. The application reconfigures itself autonomically: the workers
are added or removed depending on the system workload. This is realized by the sequence of compo-
nents: Collector, Analyser, Planner, and Executor. This sequence follows the principle of the MAPE
model for autonomic computing. The Monitoring components (Monitor, In Monitor) in the mem-
branes of the workers and in Application monitor different metrics such as served requests per minute,
and available disk space, CPU, and memory. Component Collector gathers the information from the
Monitoring components. It sends the information to the component Analyser. Based on the received
information, Analyser sends an alarm to the Planning component (Planner). The former one plans the
reconfiguration, which is enacted by the Execution component (Executor).
GCM provides the following features to the applications:
Strong separation of concerns The functional part of a GCM application can be separated from the
control part thanks to the separation of a composite component into a membrane and a content and
to the usage of functional and non-functional interfaces. In the provided example, the components
performing the reconfiguration (Collector, Analyser, Planner, Executor) are separated from the
ones responsible for the business logic (W1, W2, Repository). This separation ensures, as much
as possible, the independence of the business code – the request treatment in the example – from
the management code – the sequence of control components in the example.
Reconfiguration In GCM, the architecture of the application can be accessed and modified at runtime;
this is realized in the example by the execution component. It allows the non-functional concern to
modify the structure of the functional (and the non-functional) part of the component application,
and thus to change its behavior.
Interceptors Sometimes, some information should be shared between the functional part and the con-
trollers of the application. Interceptors are specific components inside the membrane that can
intercept the flow of functional calls in order to trigger reaction from the non-functional aspects.
For example, in the use-case, Monitor components are monitoring the number of job-requests
sent to the worker, they illustrate very well what is an interceptor. In the membrane, functional
interfaces are directly connected, however one or several interceptors can be inserted within such
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a binding and interact with other non-functional components (see the non-functional binding be-
tweenMonitor and Collector in the example).
One-to-many / many-to-one communications GCM also targets large-scale distributed systems where
an invocation is to be broadcast to several entities or simply sent to different servers to ensure load-
balancing. For this, GCM introduces one-to-many client interfaces, called multicast interfaces
like the interface M1 of Figure 1. From a structural point of view the particularity of multicast
interfaces is that they can be connected to several server interfaces. Symmetrically, GCM introduce
gathercast server interfaces for synchronizing many-to-one communications, typically waiting for
a number of communications before triggering a communication.
Our main contribution here is a formal definition and specification of the non-functional aspects of
components; we will also see how we formally insure the separation of concerns and how we formally
specify the interceptors.
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Figure 3: Principles of the VerCors platform
2.2 VerCors
VerCors is a platform for the specification, analysis, verification, and validation of the GCM-based ap-
plications. The principle of the tool is illustrated in Figure 3. First, a user specifies the architecture of
a GCM-based application, the signature of its interfaces, and the behavior of the primitive components
using VerCors Component Editor (VCE). Then, from these descriptions the behavioral model of an ap-
plication is generated (ADL2N) in a form of a dedicated behavioral semantic model: a parameterized
networks of synchronized automata (pNets). This semantic model is transformed by abstraction func-
tions (ABS*), until reaching a finite model suitable for model-checking. Finally, the resulting behavioral
model is translated (N2F) into a set of languages used by a Model Checker (CADP tool [10]). Finally,
the Model Checker verifies the correctness of the model with respect to a set of temporal logic properties
(user requirements) and in the case of detected errors it provides their description.
Once the requirements have been proven correct on the VCE specification, the user can generate the
set of files (ADL for the Architecture Description, IDL for the Interface definition in the form of Java
interfaces). Then naturally, user has to provide java classes implementing the service methods of the
primitive components. These files are processed by the GCM component factory to build an executable
application, that is executed with the GCM/ProActive execution environment.
In this paper we focus only on the structural aspect of GCM-based applications which is covered by
the VerCors Component Editor. Our purpose is to ensure that the components provided to the rest of the
tool chain are well-formed; for this we describe below a set of rules that must be satisfied to ensure the
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Element Formalization
Server interface SItf ::= (Name,MSignaturei∈Ii ,Nature)S
Client interface CItf ::= (Name,MSignaturei∈Ii ,Nature)C
Interface Itf ::= SItf | CItf
Method signature MSignature ::=MName × Type → Type
Primitive Prim ::= CName< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,M
k∈K
k ,Membr>
Composite Compos ::= CName< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,Membr,Cont>
Component Comp ::= Prim | Compos
Content Cont ::=< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,Comp
k∈K
k ,Binding
l∈L
l >
Binding Binding ::= (QName,QName)
QName ::= This.Name | CName.Name
Nature Nature ::= F | NF
Membrane Membr ::=< Compk∈Kk ,Binding
l∈L
l >
Table 1: The formalization of GCM architecture
correctness of a GCM component assembly, we describe their implementation in VCE in Section 5.
Using VerCors tool, we were able to design the architecture of the example illustrated at Figure 1,
check its static semantic correctness properties, generate ADL files and deploy the corresponding appli-
cation.
3 Formalization
The purpose of this section is to define formally well-formed components and exhibit their properties.
3.1 Structure
We start with the formal model representing the GCM architecture. First, we discuss the core elements.
Second, we formalize the non-functional part of the GCM architecture.
3.1.1 Core
In this section we define the core elements of GCM, namely: Interfaces, Components and Bindings.
Their formalization is given in Table 1. We denote Ai∈Ii a set of elements Ai indexed in a set I. The
formal definition is not provided for some elements of the table, because they are the terminal symbols.
Such elements are presented in different font (e.g. Name, Type, NF).
Each server (SItf) or client (CItf) interface is characterized by three attributes: Name is the name of
an interface;MSignatures represent the methods which can be served by a server interface or called by a
client interface, with their signature; Nature defines if it is a functional or a non-functional interface.
Each component is characterized by its name, the sets of external client and server interfaces, and
its membrane. A primitive component also includes a set of local methods. A composite component
includes its content with a specific structure. The membrane is responsible for the non-functional activity.
The content is defined by the sets of internal client and server interface, sub-components and a set of
bindings located inside the content.
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Function name Function Definition
Sym Sym : Itf→ Itf
Itf GetIt f : (Membr | Cont | Comp) → Itf
GetIt f (X :Comp |Cont) ::= SIt f (X)∪CIt f (X)
GetIt f (X :Membr) ::= Sym
(
Itf(Parent(X))∪ Itf(Cont(Parent(X))
)
GetSrc GetSrc : Binding × (Membr | Cont) → Itf
GetSrc((Src,Dst),ctnr) ::= itf s.t. Name(itf) = Name(Src)∧{
itf ∈ Itf(ctnr)∧Role(itf) = C, i f Src= This.Name
itf ∈ Itf(comp).(comp ∈ ctnr∧Name(comp) = CName), i f Src= CName.Name
GetDst GetDst : Binding × (Membr | Cont) → Itf
GetDst((Src,Dst),ctnr) ::= itf s.t. Name(itf) = Name(Dst)∧{
itf ∈ Itf(ctnr)∧Role(itf) = S, i f Dst = This.Name
itf ∈ Itf(comp).(comp ∈ ctnr∧Name(comp) = CName), i f Dst = CName.Name
Parent Parent : (Itf | Comp | Membr | Cont) → Membr | Cont | Comp
Table 2: Auxiliary functions
A binding connects two interfaces. It is described as a couple of names defining its source and target
interfaces. Each name consists of two parts. The first part describes the container of the interface, either
the name of a sub-component or the identifier This. The second part is the name of the interface itself.
3.1.2 Non-functional aspects
The Nature property of interfaces can be either functional (F) or non-functional (NF). The membrane
is the part of a component which is responsible for the non-functional aspect of an application. Its
formalization is given in the bottom of Table 1. The bindings (Bindingl∈Ll ) are the connections between
the interfaces in the membrane. A membrane can contain a set of sub-components (Compk∈Kk ). The
interceptors are recognized in this set essentially from their binding patterns, all the other components in
a membrane are simple controllers.
3.2 Auxiliary functions
In this section we introduce the auxiliary functions used for the GCM architecture well-formness formal-
ization. The auxiliary functions are given in Table 2.
First, we use auxiliary functions providing the access to the attributes of the interfaces and compo-
nents. For example, the Nature(itf : Itf) function returns the nature of an interface, Binding(membr :
Membr) returns the set of bindings in a membrane. The definitions of such functions are straightforward
and we omit them in Table 2.
Second, the symmetry function (Sym) takes an interface as an input and returns an interface with
exactly the same properties but with an opposite role: a client (. . .)C interface becomes a server (. . .)S
one and symmetrically. to
Third, we introduce aGetItf function. It takes a container (a component, a membrane or a content) as
an input and computes the set of interfaces stored by it. If its argument is a component or a content, then
its result is the union of its server and client interfaces sets. The case of membrane is more complicated
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as its internal interfaces are not explicitly defined. Instead, we compute the set of the symmetric of the
interfaces belonging to the component containing the membrane and its content.
Finally, most of the consistency rules dealing with the bindings will use the auxiliary functions
GetSrc and GetDst. They are able to retrieve the Interface objects which represent respectively the
source and the destination ends of a binding. If GetSrc and GetDst functions are applied to a binding
inside a membrane, then they may return an internal interface of the membrane.
Conversely, some rules use the Parent auxiliary function, that recovers the container (component,
membrane or content) of an interface, a component, a content or a membrane.
3.3 Interceptors
In this section we define interceptors more precisely. First, we provide the non-formal definition of an
interceptor. Then, we introduce a predicate recognizing the interceptors among the other sub-components
of a membrane.
An interceptor is a functional component inside a membrane. It is connected to one external and one
internal functional interfaces of the membrane’s parent. An interceptor ”intercepts” a functional call that
goes from outside to inside of the membrane (input interceptor) or vice versa (output interceptors). The
interceptors are used to monitor an application and its functional calls. The only functional activity of
an interceptor should be to intercept and forward the functional calls through its functional client and
server interfaces. All the other actions are performed through non-functional interfaces. To allow more
modularity in the design, interceptors can be assembled in chains inside the membrane. Interceptors in a
chain must all be either input or all output; we shall speak of input chains and output chains.
In principle, it would be possible to relax this definition, and allow for more general interceptor struc-
tures, e.g. including some parallelism in the form of multicast client interface in the “chain”, allowing
more efficient processing. However it is not clear whether this would be useful fo rreal applications,
and this not implemeted in the GCM/ProActive middleware, so we prefer to keep the (relatively) simpler
form in the formal definition.
In order to distinguish formally the interceptors from the other components, we define a predicate
IsInterc. It is given in Table3. It takes a component and a membrane as an input and returns true if the
component belongs to a chain of interceptors inside the given membrane. An interceptor chain consist of
one or several interceptors. IsInterc uses a predicate IsIntercChainwhich identifies if a given sequence of
K components is a chain of pipelined interceptors inside the given membrane. IsIntercChain predicate
checks the following features of the indexed set of components given as input:
• all the components are nested inside the membrane;
• all the components have exactly one functional server and one functional client interface;
• a functional call can go through the sequence of components. More formally, for any k ∈ 2...K
there is a binding connecting client functional interface of the component number k−1 and server
functional interface of the component number k;
• the first component of an input chain intercepts a functional call to the content while the last
component forwards the functional call to the content or vice versa for an output chain.
Predicate IsIntercChain uses two auxiliary functions: GetSItfF(comp) (resp. GetCItfF(comp)) re-
turns the sets of all functional server (resp. client) interfaces of component comp.
The predicate IsExtEnd checks, for an input interceptor chain, whether the first interceptor in the
chain is connected to a server functional interface of the parent component or, for output interceptors,
whether the last one is connected to a client functional interface of the parent component. Predicate
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Predicate name Predicate Definition
IsInterc IsInterc(comp :Comp, membr :Membr)⇔
∃ic.IsIntercChain(ic,membr)∧ comp ∈ ic;
IsIntercChain IsIntercChain({i1 ...iK} : set of Comp, membr :Membr)⇔
{i1 ...iK} ⊆Comp(membr)∧∃SI1...SIK ,CI1...CIK .
(∀k ∈ {1...K}). (GetSItfF(ik)={SIk}∧GetCItfF(ik)={CIk}) ∧
(∀k ∈ {1...K−1}).(∃bk ∈ Binding(membr).
GetSrc(bk,membr) =CIk∧GetDst(bk,membr) = SIk+1)∧
∃b0,bK ∈ Binding(membr).∃I0, IK : Itf.(
(IsExtEnd(I0,b0,SI1,membr, I0)∧ IsIntEnd(CIk,bK , IK ,membr, IK))
∨(IsIntEnd(I0,b0,SI1,membr, I0)∧ IsExtEnd(CIk,bK , IK ,membr, IK))
)
IsExtEnd IsExtEnd(CI : CItf, b : Binding, SI : SItf, membr :Membr, I : Itf)⇔
GetSrc(b,membr) = CI∧GetDst(b,membr) = SI∧Nature(I) = F∧
Sym(I) ∈ GetItf(Parent(membr))
IsIntEnd IsIntEnd(CI : CItf, b : Binding, SI : SItf, membr :Membr, I : Itf)⇔
GetSrc(b,membr) =CI∧GetDst(b,membr) = SI∧Nature(I) = F∧
If IsComposite(Parent(membr)) then
Sym(I) ∈ GetItf(Cont(Parent(membr)))
Else Sym(I) ∈ Sym(GetItf(Parent(membr)))
Table 3: Interceptor Predicates
IsIntEnd is the symmetric, it checks connection with the content. However, the content is not known
for a primitive component; in that case the interfaces of the content are computed by symmetry of the
external (functional) interfaces of the component.
3.4 Well-formed components
In this section we define the well-formness rules for GCM components. First, we introduce the core rules
and predicates used for the definition of well-formness. Then, we focus on the non-functional aspects.
3.4.1 Core
Table 4 formalizes the auxiliary predicates which are used for the definition of the following constraints:
• Components naming constraint (UniqueCompNames): all the components at the same level of
hierarchy must have different names. This restriction is due the fact that components are referenced
by their name; typically, QName can be of the form CName.Name; and if two components had the
same name the functions GetSrc and GetDst would not return a single deterministic result. The
two contents of two different composite components as well as two membranes are considered to
be different name-spaces. A membrane and a content are also different name-spaces even if they
belong to the same component.
• Interfaces naming constraint (UniqueItfNames): all the interfaces of a component must have differ-
ent names. This constraint will be checked separately, for the external interfaces of a component,
and for the internal interfaces of a content. This constraint also ensures the determinacy of the
functions GetSrc and GetDst.
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Predicate name Predicate Definition
UniqueCompNames UniqueCompNames(Compi∈Ii : set of Comp)⇔
∀i, i′ ∈ I.i 6= i′⇒ CName(Compi) 6= CName(Compi′)
UniqueItfNames UniqueItfNames(Itf i∈Ii : set of Itf)⇔
∀i, i′ ∈ I. i 6= i′⇒ Name(Itfi) 6= Name(Itfi′)
BindingRoles BindingRoles(b : Binding)⇔
Role(GetSrc(b,Parent(b))) = C ∧Role(GetDst(b,Parent(b))) = S
BindingTypes BindingTypes(b : Binding)⇔
MSignature(GetDst(b,Parent(b)))≤MSignature(GetDst(b,Parent(b)))
CardValidity CardValidity(Bindingl∈Ll : set of Binding)⇔
∀l, l′ ∈ L. l 6= l′⇒
GetSrc(Bindingl,Parent(Bindingl)) 6=GetSrc(Bindingl′ ,Parent(Bindingl′))
Table 4: Core Predicates
• Role constraint (BindingRoles): a binding must go from a client interface to a server interface.
The predicate uses a function Role(I) that returns C (resp. S) if I is a client (resp. server) interface.
• Typing constraint (BindingTypes): a binding must bind interfaces of compatible types. The com-
patibility of interfaces means that for each method of a client interface there must exist an adequate
corresponding method in the server interface. In other words, if a client interfaces is connected
to a server interface and it wants to call some method, then this method must actually exist on
the server interface. In general, a corresponding method does not need to have exactly the same
signature as the one required, but can use any sub-typing or inheritance pre-order available in the
modeling language. We denote ≤ such an order between interface signatures.
• Cardinality constraint,CardValidity, ensures that a client interface is bound to a single server one.
We use the previous constraints to define a well-formness predicate, denoted WF . It is defined
recursively on component architecture, namely on primitive components, on composite components, and
on contents.
A GCM primitive component is well-formed if all its interfaces have distinct names and its membrane
is well-formed.
Let prim : Prim= CName< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,M
k∈K
k ,Membr>; (1)
WF(prim)⇔ UniqueItfNames(SItfi∈Ii ∪CItf
j∈J
j )∧WF(Membr)
A GCM composite component is well-formed if all its external interfaces have distinct names, its content
and its membrane are well-formed.
Let compos :Compos= CName< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,Membr,Cont>; (2)
WF(compos)⇔ UniqueItfNames(SItfi∈Ii ∪CItf
j∈J
j )∧WF(Membr)∧WF(Cont)
The content of a GCM component is well-formed if all its interfaces have distinct names, all its sub-
components have distinct names, all its nested bindings ensure valid cardinality, all its sub-components
are well-formed, the role, type and nature constraints are respected for all its sub-bindings. The nature
constraint for the bindings relies on The BindingNature predicates. It is discussed in Section 3.4.2
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Predicate name Predicate Definition
UniqueNamesAndRoles UniqueNamesAndRoles(Itf i∈Ii : set of Itf)⇔
∀i, i′ ∈ I.(i 6= i′∧Name(Itfi) = Name(Itfi′))⇒ Role(Itfi) 6= Role(Itfi′)
BindingNature BindingNature(b : Binding)⇔
CL(GetSrc(b,Parent(b))) = CL(GetDst(b,Parent(b))) = 1∨
(CL(GetSrc(b,Parent(b)))> 1∧CL(GetDst(b,Parent(b)))> 1)
Table 5: Non-functional Predicates
because it is related to the non-functional aspect.
Let cont :Cont =< SItfi∈Ii ,CItf
j∈J
j ,Comp
k∈K
k ,Binding
l∈L
l >; (3)
WF(cont)⇔


UniqueItfNames(SItfi∈Ii ∪CItf
j∈J
j )∧UniqueCompNames(Comp
k∈K
k )∧
CardValidity(Bindingl∈Ll )∧∀k ∈ K.WF(Compk)∧
∀B ∈ Bindingl∈Ll .BindingRoles(B)∧BindingTypes(B)∧BindingNature(B)
The well-formness of a membrane is only significant for the non-functional aspect, it is defined below.
3.4.2 Non-functional aspects
In this section we define the static semantics constraints ensuring safe composition of the non-functional
part of a GCM-based application. Correctness of a membrane relies on the two predicates defined in
Table 5:
• Interfaces naming constraint (UniqueNamesAndRoles): if there are two interfaces with the same
names in a membrane, then they must have different roles. This is as slight relaxation from the
UniqueItfNames rule of the general case: we want to allow corresponding external/internal inter-
faces pairs of opposite role to have the same name. This also ensure compatibility with the original
Fractal model, where internal interfaces were implicitly defined as the symmetric of external ones.
• Binding nature constraint(BindingNature) is a rule imposing the separation of concerns between
functional and non-functional aspects. We want the functional interfaces to be bound together
(only functional requests will be going through these), and non-functional interfaces to be con-
nected together as a separate aspect. This is simple to impose in the content of composite compo-
nents, but a little more tricky in the membrane because of the specific status of interceptors.
The solution is to qualify as functional all the components in a content and all the interceptors,
while all other components in the membrane are non-functional. Then the interfaces are declared
functional or non-functional. From this we compute for each interface a control level ranging from
1 to 3, where 1 means functional; 2 and 3 mean non-functional. Then the compatible interfaces
are either both “1”, or both greater than “1”. TheControlLevel function is formally defined as:
CL(X : Comp) ::=
{
2, i f Parent(X ,context) :Membr∧ ¬IsInterc(X ,Parent(X)))
1, else
CL(X : Cont | Membr) ::= 1
CL(X : Itf) ::=
{
CL(Parent(X)), i f Nature(X) = F
CL(Parent(X))+1, i f Nature(X) = NF
(4)
This constraint on the nature of bindings was already mentioned in [15], we propose here a formal
definition that is simpler and more intuitive.
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As the last step, we define the well-formness predicate for membranes. A membrane is well-formed if
all its sub-components have distinct names, the naming constraint is respected for its interfaces, all its
sub-components are well-formed, all its bindings ensure a valid cardinality, and the role, type, nature
constraints are respected for all its sub-bindings,
Let membr :Membr =< Compk∈Kk ,Binding
l∈L
l >; (5)
WF(membr)⇔


UniqueCompNames(Compk∈Kk )∧UniqueNamesAndRoles(Itf(membr))∧
∀k ∈ K.WF(Compk)∧CardValidity(Binding
l∈L
l )∧
∀B ∈ Bindingl∈Ll .BindingRoles(B)∧BindingTypes(B)∧BindingNature(B)
This section presented an extension to the definition of well-formed components defined in previous
works [12, 11]. More precisely, most of the definitions given in this section allow us to formalize the
notion of well-formed non-functional features and well-formed interceptors, that have never been for-
malized before. The new definition of well-formed components is the basis for the correct composition
of distributed components with clear separation of concerns.
3.5 Properties
The well-formed definition of the preceding section guarantees that, from an architectural point of view,
the specified component assembly behaves well, both at deployment time and during execution. More
precisely, the constraints specified above ensure the following properties:
Component encapsulation Bindings do not cross boundaries. Indeed, GetSrc and GetDst predicates
are only defined in the context of the parent component, for example, the call to GetDst and
GetSrc inside the definition of the BindingRoles predicate ensure that both bound interfaces are
either internal interfaces of the parent component or external interfaces of its sub-components,
which guarantees that no binding crosses component boundaries.
Deterministic communications TheCardValidity predicate guarantees that each client interface is bound
to a single server interface, which guarantees that each communication between components is
targeted at a single, well-defined, destination. Section 4.1 will introduce mutlticast interfaces to
express communications with multiple destinations.
Unique naming Several predicates ensure the uniqueness of component or interface names in each
scope (sub-components of the same component, interfaces of the same component, etc.). This
restriction is crucial for introspection and modification of the component structure. For example
rebinding of interfaces can be easily expressed based on component and interface names.
Separation of concerns The definition of non-functional aspects ensure that: 1) each component has
a well-defined nature: functional if it belongs to the content, and non-functional if it belongs to
the membrane. 2) each interface has a well-defined control level, depending on the component it
belongs to and on the nature of the interface. The nature of components and interfaces is defined
by the control-level (CL) predicate. 3) Bindings only connect together functional (resp. non-
functional) interfaces. 4) We clearly identify interceptor components that are the only structural
exception to these rules: an interceptor is a component in the membrane that can have a single
functional client and a single functional server interface, but as many non-functional interfaces as
necessary.
In order to guarantee that the generated ADL deploys correctly, i.e. without runtime error, it is
sufficient to ensure that (1) each interface and class the ADL file refers to exists (which is ensured by the
generation process), that (2) no binding exception will be raised at instantiation time (which is ensured
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by the well-formedness property and in particular by the determinacy of communications), and that (3)
each mandatory interface is bound and thus the component system can be started without error (which
is again ensured by the well-formedness property dealing with bindings); finally (4) the unique names
ensure that the components and interfaces can be manipulated adequately during instantiation. All those
arguments ensure that each ADL file generated by our platform deploys correctly, provided the well-
formed property is verified by the system.
The properties verified by well-formed components not only guarantee that the ADL generated from
a well-formed specification deploys correctly, but also ensure some crucial properties concerning the
runtime semantics (deterministic communications, separation of concerns, reconfigurability ...).
4 Extension and Related Work
While Section 3 focused on the core concepts of a component model with componentized membranes,
we illustrate in this section how our framework can be used to model other features of GCM or of other
component models. We also compare our approach with related works.
4.1 Collective communications
One of the crucial features of GCM is to enable one-to-many and many-to-one communications through
specific interfaces, namely gathercast and multicast.
In order to specify such communications let us add a Cardinality (Card) field in the specification of
the GCM interfaces. The cardinality can be singleton, multicast or gathercast. For example, interface
M1 at Figure 1 is multicast: it sends requests to several workers at the same time. G1 is gathercast: it can
receive requests from several workers. S1 and C1 are singleton interfaces.
These new interfaces modify the definition of cardinality validity. In particular, the multicast interface
allows two bindings to originate from the same client interface. The CardValidity is modified as follows:
CardValidity(Bindingl∈Ll : set of Binding)⇔∀itf : Itf.∀l, l
′ ∈ L.l 6= l′
(itf=GetSrc(Bindingl ,Parent(Bindingl))=GetSrc(Bindingl′ ,Parent(Bindingl′)⇒Card(itf)=multicast)
The intended semantics is that any invocation emitted by a multicast interface is sent to all the server
interfaces bound to it. Gathercast interface on the contrary synchronizes several invocations arriving at
the same server interface, they do not entail any structural constraint. An interceptor chain should not
contain any multicast functional interface because it should transmit invocations in a one-to-one manner.
4.2 Other component models
Our work is placed in the context of GCM component model but it can also be used to model the char-
acteristics of most component models, we review some of them in this paragraph. First, concerning the
functional parts of components, a lot of component models have a structure similar to GCM components,
like, e.g., SCA [1] or Fractal [7]. Our framework can be used to formally define architectural correctness
for these component models. Additionally, several frameworks offer different notion of componentized
component control, we focus on these aspects below.
SOFA 2.0 [9] features hierarchical composition and componentized component control. Interest-
ingly, similarly to our approach, one of the objectives of SOFA is also to provide formal verification
tools for distributed component systems. It is easy to adapt our formal specification to SOFA 2.0, more
14 Verifying the correct composition of distributed components: Formalisation and Tool
precisely: Micro-controllers are components dedicated to non-functional concerns, they reside in the
membrane and are not hierarchical: to take them into account, we should restrict the correctness rules for
the membrane to only allow primitive components in the membrane. The other aspects of SOFA are not
different from the model used in this paper. In particular, delegation chains are chains of interceptors,
following exactly the rules defined in Section 3.3.
AOKell [16] is an extension of Fractal specifically for componentizing membranes, it is interesting to
note that the authors define a notion of control level, which is quite similar to the ControlLevel function
used in our paper. In this case again, our approach could be used to verify the correct composition of
AOKell-based components, and ensure the safe design of AOKell component systems.
In a similar way, Dynaco [8] could also benefit from our approach, it is a component model targeting
dynamic adaptation and allowing full-fledged components in component’s membranes.
4.3 Related Approaches
In a slightly different application domain, BIP [6, 3] is a formal framework that allows building and
analyzing complex component-based systems, both synchronous (reactive) or asynchronous (distributed)
by coordinating the behaviour of a set of primitive and heterogeneous components. BIP is supported by a
tool set including translators from various programming languages as Lustre and C into BIP, a compiler
for generating code executable by a dedicated engine, and the verification tool dFinder.
Concerning the formalization of component structure, the two closest previous works are the for-
malization of Fractal in Alloy [14], and the formalization of GCM in Isabelle/HOL [12]. The first
framework focuses on structural aspects in order to prove the realisability of component systems, while
the second aims at providing lemmas and theorems to reason on component models at a meta-level, and
prove generic properties of the component model. None of those formalizations included the notion of
non-functional components, many-to-many interfaces, or interceptors. The formal specification of com-
ponent correctness defined in this paper could be used to extend the expressiveness of the component
model in the Alloy and the Isabelle frameworks. Also the strength of the present work is that it is di-
rectly implemented in the VCE environment in order to provide tools accessible for the programmer.
The tools presented here ensure, in a graphical environment, that the component systems composed by
the programmer are well-formed.
From another point of view, in [11] we investigated a language for generating correct-by-construction
component systems, and reconfiguring them safely. Similarly to the cases above, this language does not
deal with the structure of the membrane and one-to-many/many-to-one communications, it should be
extended to the enhanced component structure presented here.
5 Implementation: the VCE modeling environment
The presented formal model and formal constraints were implemented in a tool called VerCors Com-
ponent Editor (VCE v.3) which is the graphical specification part of the VerCors project. VCE v.3
combines a set of semantics models and graphical diagram editors, the tools for graphical and textual
export of models and a set of additional wizards. Using VCE v.3 one can design the architecture of a
componentS-based system, validate its structure according to the rules specified in this paper and export
its representation, either as an ADL (XML) file, that will be used in the execution environment, or as a
semantic representation, for model-checking. We briefly discuss below the basic features of the tool.
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Figure 4: VCE v.3
VCE v.3 is an Eclipse-based platform built using ObeoDesigner2, EMF3 and GMF3. Figure 4 is a
screen-shot of GCM Components diagram editor. It has a standard interface of an Eclipse-based appli-
cation.
The static semantics constraints, defined in the previous sections are encoded in VCE v.3 in order
to validate component assemblies. The Acceleo language4 is used for the definition of such rules. An
example of a rule defining the naming constraint for the components is given below:
[not self.siblings(Component)->collect(name)->includes(self.name)/]
This rule will be applied to each component. Here, self is the component on which the constraint is
validated; let us denote itC. The function siblings(Component) returns the set of all the components
in the same container as C. The function collect(name) extracts the names of all such components.
Finally, includes(self.name) checks if there is any component with the same name as C and returns
true if it finds one.
VCE v.3 editor reports about the constraint violations. The elements of the architecture which are
not correct are marked with red signs. The description of an error is given in a standard Eclipse Problem
panel. Figure 4 illustrates an example of the architecture validation result; the architecture contains only
one error: there is a binding between two interfaces with incompatible types (C1 and S1).
To conclude, based on the formal definitions given in this paper, we implemented an environment
for the specification of the component-based applications involving group communications and with
strong separation of functional and non-functional concerns. The validation of designed models ensures
the correctness of the components assemblies. From this specification VerCors environment allows the
verification of the behavioural properties of the system, and the generation of executable code that is safe
by construction and can be run using the GCM/ProActive library.
2http://www.obeodesigner.com/
3http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/ http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/gmf/
4http://www.eclipse.org/acceleo/
16 Verifying the correct composition of distributed components: Formalisation and Tool
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This article presented the formalization of rich component models with strong separation of functional
and non-functional concerns, including the definition of interceptors. It also presented a tool implement-
ing the formalized model. The main contributions of the article are:
• the formal definition of GCM components including non-functional aspect and interceptors;
• the formal definition of well-formness predicates including special rules for non-functional as-
pects, binding compatibility, and interceptors; special care has been put on the separation of con-
cerns: the notion of control level was introduced and formally defined for the interfaces and com-
ponents;
• implementation of a tool for GCM-based systems architecture graphical modeling and their static
semantics validation.
• the identification of basic and crucial properties of the component assemblies which are guaranteed
by our rules, and by the VCE platform. In particular, when a GCM application specification has
been checked valid in VCE, the generated ADL file is guaranteed correct by construction, and the
corresponding components will be built and deployed correctly (with no execution error) by the
middleware component factory.
One of the key challenges addressed by this paper is the clear representation of interceptors chains
and especially the formalization of predicates which recognize them among the other components inside
a membrane.
Our approach is general enough to be extensible in order to take into account many-to-many com-
munications or other component models.
However, the VerCors platform is not completely implemented yet. We are now working on the
representation and validation of GCM-based systems behavior using UML State Machines for the def-
inition of primitive components behavior in VCE v.3. This functionality is already partially specified
and implemented. The state-machine and architecture models will be used to generate a finite semantic
representation, suitable as the input to verification tools. The structural wellformess rules from this paper
will have to be complemented by others, ensuring the coherency between the structural and behavioural
models.
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